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Flight problems, not turbulence, found in death of former White House official
The flight that left a former White House official dead earlier this month was marked by a series of missteps, alerts and system issues before the plane lurched violently in the sky, according to a preliminary report Friday from the National Transportation Safety Board. (link to NTSB report in story) (www.washingtonpost.com) Altro...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
WA Post is a gutter rag not fit to wrap fish in.
Trim runaway is an emergency procedure practiced in recurrent PC12 training. We used to joke about how that would never happen...
Had it happen in a King Air - pretty exciting LOL!
Well for a reasoned and thoughtful analysis see Blancolirio's post:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oc_71HNJZhU (NTSB Preliminary N300ER Challenger 300 Dana Hyde)
It was not turbulence, but appears to be pilot error resulting in a series of abrupt pitch up/down moves, with +4.2 g and -2.3 g accelerations. The pitch up/down could easily snap the neck of someone, even if seatbelt was on. (basal skull fracture like Dale Earnhart)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oc_71HNJZhU (NTSB Preliminary N300ER Challenger 300 Dana Hyde)
It was not turbulence, but appears to be pilot error resulting in a series of abrupt pitch up/down moves, with +4.2 g and -2.3 g accelerations. The pitch up/down could easily snap the neck of someone, even if seatbelt was on. (basal skull fracture like Dale Earnhart)
thanks for the link. Yes, Juan Brown aka youtube blancolirio has the most insightful and trustworthy accounts of aviation incidents.
Should read flight control system related issues contributed to passengers death…
Again, not a pilot nor in aviation, but could the crew have caused this by referring to the wrong checklist for the cautions being shown? Specifically, it seems they looked up PRI STAB TRIM FAIL and executed that list, rather than AP STAB TRIM FAIL, which was the actual caution message? This is from the preliminary report:
The flight crew reported that around 6,000 ft, they observed multiple EICAS caution messages. The crew recalled EICAS messages of ‘AP STAB TRIM FAIL’ [autopilot stabilizer trim failure] ‘MACH TRIM FAIL’ and ‘AP HOLDING NOSE DOWN’. Neither crewmember could recall exactly what order the EICAS messages were presented. They also reported that additional EICAS messages may have been annunciated. The PIC asked the SIC to refer to the quick reference handbook. The SIC, via an electronic flight bag (iPad), located the quick reference card and the ‘PRI STAB TRIM FAIL’ [Primary Stabilizer Trim Failure] checklist. The SIC visually showed the PIC the checklist, and they both agreed to execute the checklist. The first action on the checklist was to move the stabilizer trim switch (‘STAB TRIM’), located on the center console, from ‘PRI’ (Primary) to ‘OFF.’ The SIC read the checklist item aloud and he subsequently moved the switch to off. As soon as the switch position was moved, the airplane abruptly pitched up.
The flight crew reported that around 6,000 ft, they observed multiple EICAS caution messages. The crew recalled EICAS messages of ‘AP STAB TRIM FAIL’ [autopilot stabilizer trim failure] ‘MACH TRIM FAIL’ and ‘AP HOLDING NOSE DOWN’. Neither crewmember could recall exactly what order the EICAS messages were presented. They also reported that additional EICAS messages may have been annunciated. The PIC asked the SIC to refer to the quick reference handbook. The SIC, via an electronic flight bag (iPad), located the quick reference card and the ‘PRI STAB TRIM FAIL’ [Primary Stabilizer Trim Failure] checklist. The SIC visually showed the PIC the checklist, and they both agreed to execute the checklist. The first action on the checklist was to move the stabilizer trim switch (‘STAB TRIM’), located on the center console, from ‘PRI’ (Primary) to ‘OFF.’ The SIC read the checklist item aloud and he subsequently moved the switch to off. As soon as the switch position was moved, the airplane abruptly pitched up.