Exhibition jumps into stadiums using round parachutes were quite routine during the 1950s and 60s by expert skydivers using high-performance round parachutes, such as the Paracommander, and even much lower performance modified military parachutes, such as the 28' C-9 with seven gore TU modification. Twenty some years ago, I had a malfunction on my square main parachute during deployment while making an exhibition jump into the Richmond Academy football stadium near downtown Augusta, Georgia. I released my streamered main and deployed my reserve, a notoriously hard to steer Para Innovators Featherlight round parachute. Because the malfunction procedures had taken some time, I was a little low over a crowded residential neighborhood with extensive power lines and my safest landing option was the football stadium. So I took a deep breath and set up an approach into the wind and landed midway between the sidelines on the 45 yard line. Then I gathered up my gear and went to look for some

(Written on 13/05/2016)(Permalink)

Pete, I respectfully ask that you check out the information at the following link: (http://www.pilotworkshop.com/tips/flight_plan_advisories.htm). I have verified it independently with the appropriate FAA resources (local and center ATC facility management, a respected operations inspector at local FSDO, manager at regional FSS, and several different very experienced and well regarded CFI's with combined experience of >100 years). Perhaps a little more such research when you post will, in the future, help prevent from posting incorrect and potentially dangerous information. VFR flight plans add nothing to air traffic control traffic separation functions or in-flight safety. They only facilitate helping search and rescue find the wreckage and casualties-PERIOD! And again, I agree that ATC flight following, when available is always advisable for VFR cross country flight.

(Written on 14/10/2015)(Permalink)

Peter, I was not being abrasive at all, but I'm about to be. I have repeatedly agreed with your repeated insistence that VFR flight following with ATC is an excellent safety tool with many safety advantages and that I personally ALWAYS use it WHEN AVAILABLE, WHICH IS NOT ALWAYS. I do not agree that you should never fly VFR without it, NOR DOES THE FAA OR NTSB. IT IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE FAR'S AND, QUITE FRANKLY, IF YOU CAN'T FLY VFR WITHOUT IT, YOU'RE PROBABLY NOT COMPETENT ENOUGH TO FLY AT ALL! Nor do I agree faster, heavier IFR traffic should be allowed to blast blindly around in the VMC sky, ploughing over any VFR "mosquitoes" unfortunate enough to get in their path. In addition, I have to ask, have you ever heard of either NORDO or no transponder in Class F airspace; both legal and even necessary for some aircraft. Is that abrasive enough for you? Remember flight training 101, Peter? Under or unpowered traffic has the right of way over higher powered traffic? Lower traffic h

(Written on 03/08/2015)(Permalink)

Gentlemen, a post script on this discussion: I went out to the airport this afternoon and sat in a Cessna 152 (same basic visibility as a Cessna 150) on the ground. I think I can say with little fear of contradiction that it is basically impossible for a pilot of such an aircraft to see higher left crossing traffic, even as close as 200' higher at any clock position lower than about 10:30. The pilot sits about 8"-10" almost directly under the center of left wing and has no visibility of higher traffic from about 7:00-9:30, although he can see traffic at the same altitude with difficulty and lower easily. From 9:30-10:30, the pitot tube, fuel tank vent tube, and especially the wing strut will partially mask side traffic at the same level and lower for the wing strut. After this exercise, I'm convinced that the Cessna 150 had no chance to see the F-16 except for a horrifying and mercifully brief split second glimpse just prior to impact. I am convinced that he had no chance for see and

(Written on 26/07/2015)(Permalink)

Peter, thank you for the verification; a cross check is always useful. Well, the NTSB report had a report radar return on the Cessna at 1,400 at 1100:49. I am assuming impact at 1100:55; calculations could support a couple of seconds variation and we don't know what, if any radar delays are present. I am assuming negligible for a mission critical Air Traffic Control system. Another 6 second of climb would put him another 30-40' higher. Unfortunately, the results confirm the calculations or vise versa. I still fail to see much utility here in a VFR flight plan. ATC doesn't use them for anything I know of except after the fact to resolve ELT transmissions and look for crash sites; nothing during actual VFR flight operations. I just verified that with Anderson Flight Service Station and ATC doesn't even find out about them unless there is a potential Search and Rescue need (including an unclosed flight plan). If you fail to close one (and things often do get hectic at the end of a fligh

(Written on 26/07/2015)(Permalink)

Preacher, your comments are spot on, with one possible exception. It was not reported nor does it appear that the Cessna 150 was ever in the CHS Class C airspace; a map review appears to show that departing runway 23 and immediately turning out and climbing on a heading of 110º, he remained several miles north of it. Had he wanted to penetrate the the Class C airspace, he would have had to have a Mode C transponder on (which he did) and have two way radio contact with Charleston Approach (which he didn't). The Preliminary NTSB Report states, "For the duration of its flight, the pilot of the Cessna did not contact CHS approach control, nor was he required to do so." A previous thread pretty well established that the collision occurred in Class F airspace outside of the CHS Class C airspace. Have a nice nap, sounds like a good idea to me...

(Written on 25/07/2015)(Permalink)

Preacher, the Preliminary NTSB Report states for the last 3 minutes of the Cessna 150's flight, "For the duration of its flight, the pilot of the Cessna did not contact CHS approach control, nor was he required to do so." I have seen nothing to contradict that. The only 1,000' separation reported by that report ("At 1100:54, the radar reported altitude of the F-16 remained at 1,500 feet and no valid altitude information was returned for the radar target associated with the Cessna. At that point the targets were laterally separated by about 1,000 feet.") or anywhere else I have seen was the lateral separation being closed over the about the last 3 seconds prior to impact. That sounds and calculates about right. The 1400' reported altitude reported 8 seconds prior to impact also appears to be correct (within the accuracy of the Cessna 150's Mode C transponder's allowable limit of error). The last 8 seconds of climb yields about an additional 50' ±100 foot instrument error, unfortunatel

(Written on 25/07/2015)(Permalink)

First answer: If the F-16 doesn't turn to 180, he probably missed it slightly. Probably upsets him somewhat with turbulence. I wouldn't want to face it. Good idea here, let's all just ignore ATC IFR traffic separation instructions and hope for a random, positive outcome. Why would you even bring that up? If the F-16 had executed the requested and required IMMEDIATE turn (How quickly can an F-16 execute a maximum performance 15º turn at, say 250 knots? 1-3 seconds?) According to the report (during about the last 20-21 seconds before impact), "Over the next 18 seconds, the track of the F-16 began turning southerly.". Not "... turned to 180.", but "... began turning southerly.". A maximum performance turn would have been over in no time flat. Sounds pretty unhurried to me; NOT IMMEDIATE. That is not necessarily true, but that's what it sounds like. The full NTSB and USAF investigations and conclusions will provide the final answers to those questions. As an aside, for the life of me, I can

(Written on 25/07/2015)(Permalink)

Peter, I have reread the Preliminary NTSB several times and I'm honestly having a hard time understanding the 1,000' vertical separation you have referred to several times. The F-16 was apparently stable at 1,500' (assigned 1600') and a stable course of 215º: The Cessna 150 took off fully or near fully loaded from MKS (elevation 73') and apparently immediately assumed a maximum climb of just under 400 fps on a stable course of 110º. The last time that there was 1,000' of vertical separation between the two aircraft was a little over a minute after the Cessna 150 took off and about two minutes prior to the collision. The aircraft were converging vertically CONTINUOUSLY for the entire just over 3 minutes between take off and collision. At ~37 seconds before the collision, the Cessna 150's reported altitude was 1200', just 300' lower than the F-16. At ~6 seconds prior to collision, the Cessna 150's reported altitude was 1,400', just 100' below the F-16, with1/2 mile separation. I don't kn

(Written on 25/07/2015)(Permalink)

Cessna close to a max climb heavily loaded should be about 60 knots or about 100 fps; F-16 (according to USAF) 200-250 knots or about 340-425 fps and slightly lower. Near right angle (actually 75º) lateral convergence that gives about a 355-435 fps convergence rate. First called by ATC at 2 miles or 10,560 feet or 24-30 seconds. Seems to me to plenty of time to see and avoid. We know the F-16 should not have been distracted as ATC had specifically called the traffic, although they may have been slightly off on the heading (initially ~11:30-11:45 converging to 12:00. Basically, straight ahead less than 300' below at 2 miles and climbing perhaps another 175' over the remaining time. Straight ahead

(Written on 24/07/2015)(Permalink)